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Abstract: Th is paper explores Martin Heidegger’s critique of previous approaches to 
history, his diff erentiation of history as object of inquiry and temporal enactment, and 
his attempt in the late 1930’s to engage the past and rethink history from an inherently 
futural—and not merely subjectively or objectively grounded—decision and “enowning 
event” (Ereignis). Works of history are neither simply factual nor socially constructed 
for Heidegger but exhibit a hermeneutical or communicative event of disclosure—via 
understanding, interpretation, and appropriation—and concealment in relation to the 
facticity and possibilities of historical existence.
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1. Introduction
Th e following remarks address Martin Heidegger’s thinking of history 
as decision and event in the posthumously published works of the late 1930’s. 
Th e importance of the question of history to Heidegger’s thought is undeniable 
and yet his signifi cance for the philosophy of history remains underappreciated. 
Beginning with the early Karl Löwith and Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger’s 
stress on approaching history through the history of philosophy was judged 
as distancing his thought from the materiality of real historical processes, 
structures, and agents. In Heidegger’s analysis, however, philosophy does 
not signify a derivative or superstructural intellectual history; it confronts 
questions of how and formally indicates the ways in which human beings exist, 
i.e., the basic comportment and disposition of human existence as being-there 
(Dasein) temporally in-the-world. Heidegger’s destructuring confrontation 
with the history of ontology and metaphysics has a critical and transformative 
dimension by engaging ordinary and everyday ways of behaving, as structured 
by tradition and average public life, rather than remaining in the intellectual “life 
of the mind.”
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Heidegger’s trajectory was repeatedly impacted by historical occurrences 
from the First and Second World Wars to the Cold War that elicited further 
historical refl ection. Aft er notoriously actively and enthusiastically supporting 
National Socialism in its fi rst years in power, a well-documented commitment 
deserving ruthless criticism, Heidegger began by the mid-1930’s to confront its 
destructive giganticism, machination, racial biologism, and totalitarian integration 
in the context of the unfolding of western metaphysics. Th ese historical refl ections 
are informed and distorted by the crisis of his times and reveal a signifi cant—if 
not unproblematic—questioning of previous and contemporary approaches 
to and stagings of the historical that continue to speak to our contemporary 
situation. It is this “other beginning” in Heidegger’s thinking of history that I 
hope to explicate in the subsequent refl ections.
Heidegger’s works of the late 1930’s resonate with while transforming 
his so-called “existential” account of history in Being and Time, which was 
developed in the context of the threefold “ec-static” character of temporality. 
Th ese later refl ections radicalize in particular the interruptive force of the future 
as well as his earlier distinction between history as an external object of inquiry 
and history as an on-going event and performative enactment of being. In his 
historical writings, we can observe how Heidegger practiced history. Although 
primarily oriented toward the history of western philosophy and its modern 
consequences, including basic features of modernity like technology and 
bureaucracy, they can be interpreted as an exemplar or conditional model for 
historical inquiry. Heidegger attempted in these works to encounter the past not 
“as it was”—as a retrieval of the past in its past presence, the identity of pure 
unsullied origins, or of the “fi rst beginning”—but from the non-identity and 
interruptive force of what he called the “other beginning,” which is accessible 
in its relation to and diff erence from the fi rst. Instead of reifying the past in its 
empirical factuality, or reducing it to a construct imposed on it by the present, 
Heidegger articulates the dynamic temporal relationality of the historical as 
well as a diff erent relation with history in which the present can encounter and 
respond to the past. Such historical responsiveness, a letting or releasement 
allowing beings to be immanently encountered and engaged on their own terms, 
would move toward the past phenomenologically as it shows itself from itself 
even as that past escapes and remains irreducible to present eff orts—whether 
narrative or causal—to grasp and manage it.
Whereas descriptive-analytic approaches to history risk missing 
the present situation in which the past is received and interpreted, due to the 
historicity and temporal diff erence of past and present, historical constructivism 
threatens to idealistically reduce the alterity of the past to the sameness of the 
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present or a current system of signifi ers such as consciousness, language, or 
society. Heidegger’s works suggest rethinking history through the possibility of 
encountering and responding to the past in its historicity, in both its continuity 
and discontinuity with the present, by pursuing the temporality of being as an 
inherently future-oriented—and thus not merely subjectively or objectively 
grounded—decision (Ent-scheidung) and enowning event (Ereignis).1
Th is interpretation of history has signifi cant implications for contem-
porary refl ection on history and historical inquiry, since it entails that historical 
events have an ontological as well as ontic dimension. Th at is, history involves a 
relational way or manner of being as much as it does objectively and instrumen-
tally available entities and structures. If the historical is both relational, constitut-
ing a between (Zwischen) or a nexus (Zusammenhang) from and to which under-
standing proceeds, and asymmetrical, such that there is an unavoidable alterity 
in relating past, present and future, then it is insuffi  cient to consider history as 
consisting of temporally equivalent factual occurrences or socially constructed 
objects. Likewise, historical works disclose and allow a world to be encountered 
and engaged. Th ey do not only descriptively reproduce events or replicate sub-
jective and intersubjective interests and preferences. Beyond history construed 
as reproducing the empirically given or the socially constructed, and truth as 
consisting of correspondence with the actual or the coherence of a system of 
statements, the historical more fundamentally and constitutively occurs as the 
performative enactment, disclosure, and appropriation of a world. In disclosing 
and concealing, gathering together and dispersing, and closing off  and opening 
up, historical works constitute a world and a way of being in that world.
Although Heidegger’s “being-historical thinking” (Seinsgeschichtliches 
Denken, as thinking history in the context of the history of being) is not a meth-
odology or program for historical inquiry, it has repercussions for such inquiry 
by diverging from history conceived of as the construction of fi rst-person nar-
ratives and third-person causal explanations according to teleological, causal, 
and authorial schemas. In this deviant history, which risks hearing the other and 
unsaid of history, historically mindful refl ection (Besinnung) elucidates a herme-
neutical event of disclosure—via understanding, interpretation, and appropria-
tion—in the context of its standing-outside-of-itself and expropriation in the 
facticity and possibilities of historical being.
1 I refer to Eriegnis as “event,” and sometimes “enowning event,” in order to avoid overly techni-
cally interpreting the word in its translation. Although it should not be understood as an ontic or 
empirical happening or fact, it seems imprudent to drop the ordinary German sense of “event” 
for “appropriation” or “enownment” given that Ereignis is also described as “dis-appropriation” and 
“disowning” (Enteignis).
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2. Th e Question of Decision
“Th e historical does not denote a manner of grasping and exploring but 
the very event (Ereignis) itself. Th e historical is not the past, not even the 
present, but the future, that which is commended to the will, to expecta-
tion, to care.”2
“But just as little [as it is the past] is this happening (Ereignis) the pres-
ent. Th e happening and the happenings of history are primordially and 
always the future, that which in a concealed way comes toward us, a reve-
latory process that puts us at risk, and thus is compelling in advance. Th e 
future is the beginning of all happening. Everything is enclosed within 
the beginning.”3
One fundamental task of Heidegger’s posthumously published Contri-
butions to Philosophy4 is to prepare for a possible decision. Heidegger asks what 
this decision is about and answers that it is about history and the loss of history, 
i.e., of belonging to being or to non-belonging in the abandonment of beings 
(GA 65: 44, 100). Th is decision is about historicity and the lack of history, and is 
a decision for or against history (GA 65: 13, 32, 504). It is a decision that is not 
about history, neutrally evaluating and explaining it from outside, but a decision 
enacting history in its historicity or the specifi city and singularity of its historical 
being.
Heidegger asks who is to make this decision and responds with seem-
ingly contradictory answers. It is being (Sein) who decides; it is the few and the 
2. Martin Heidegger, GA 45: Grundfragen der Philosophie. Second Edition. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1992), 40-41. Translation: Basic Questions of Philosophy. Tr. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1994). All Heidegger references are to the pagination of the Gesa-
mtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976-ongoing) unless otherwise noted (hereaft er referred to 
as GA, volume number, and page numbers). Other volumes cited include: GA 21 (1995) Logik. 
Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Second Edition; GA 51 (1991) Grundbegriff e. Second Edition / (1993) 
Basic Concepts. Tr. Gary Aylesworth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; GA 56/57 (1987) Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophie; GA 60 (1995) Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens; GA 61 (1994) Phä-
nomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Second Edition; GA 65 (1989) Beiträge zur Philosophie: 
(Vom Ereignis) / Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning. Tr. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999); GA 66 (1997) Besinnung / Mindfulness. Tr. P. Emad and T. Kalary 
(London: Continuum, 2006); GA 67 (1999) Metaphysik und Nihilismus; GA 69 (1998) Die Geschichte 
des Seyns; (IM) Einführung in die Metaphysik. Fourth Edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976) / Introduc-
tion to Metaphysics. Tr. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
3 Martin Heidegger, GA 45: 36-37.
4 Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis, hereaft er Contributions. Th e best introduction to this 
complex and admittedly off -putting work is Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to 
Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
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rare who decide (GA 65: 96); it is “everyone” who decides (GA 65: 100). Who 
then decides? It is the singular, the few, and the many (GA 65: 97) that decide 
even in not deciding and not wishing to decide (GA 65: 100). Heidegger inquires 
into how this decision is to be made. It is not “made” but occurs, and it transpires 
in such a way that it can be intimated and prepared for or not. What then does 
this decision about history signify and how is this decision itself historical? Who 
decides history and who is it that is thereby historically decided? Th ese are the 
guiding questions of Heidegger’s thinking of history as the history of being in 
the mid and late 1930’s. It is a time of pain and trauma, crisis and violence, of 
gigantism and machination—a time of distress and of deciding and evading de-
cision in response to this distress and abandonment.
To help understand these questions, it is relevant to consider how Heidegger 
intensifi es the strategy of historical destructuring (Destruktion), fi rst developed in 
his reading of early Christianity in the early 1920’s and familiar from Being and Time, 
as confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) in the 1930’s. Auseinandersetzung is a setting-
apart-from-one-other and diff erentiation through the responsive releasement or 
letting of a non-violent encounter and non-dominating confrontation. Deeply 
concerned with issues of violence, power, and domination during this period, 
Heidegger replied to the brutality of his time not by abandoning the agonistic 
dimension of his thought but by speaking of non-power (Ohnmacht) as something 
other than a vice as well as of a non-violent and non-coercive contest and struggle 
that would contrast with and contest its ideological deformation in the self-
assertion of the will and struggle for existence.5 It is interesting to note in this 
regard that whereas Heidegger himself embraced the language of the assertion of 
the will in 1933, notably in the Rektoratsrede, a few years later he would reject such 
self-aggrandizing of the subject, its authorship and willing, arguing for the priority 
of the work over the agency, genius, and will of the subject and that “all willing 
should be grounded in letting” (IM, 16). Th is questioning of power and violence, its 
gigantism, interventionism, and totalization, makes the Contributions—as Reiner 
Schürmann argued—a highly political work.6
A signifi cant feature of the Contributions and related manuscripts is Hei-
degger’s articulation of history (Geschichte) as intimating an alternative to ordi-
nary understandings of history and the dominant models of historiography and 
5 Despite Heidegger’s rejection of the pseudo-Darwinistic notion of the “struggle for existence” 
(Kampf ums Dasein), Levinas equates his agonistic thinking with it. For an important discussion, 
see Robert Bernasconi, “Levinas and the Struggle for Existence” in Nelson, Kapust, Still (eds.), 
Addressing Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).
6 Reiner Schürmann, “Riveted to a Monstrous Site.” in Th e Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and 
Politics, edited by Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1992), 313-314.
102
the philosophy and science of history (Historie). Heidegger indicated the traces 
of the other of this history, an other history to the present history of totalizing 
and destructive machination. Contrary to the reduction of the past and future 
to the interests and projects of the present, Heidegger seeks to open up history 
through another history. Th is history is not “future-oriented” in the usual sense 
that the future will merely continue and reaffi  rm the prejudices of the present. 
It is rather oriented by the unfamiliarity and noncalculability of the futural al-
ways-still-other “not yet,” a not yet that would not continue and reproduce the 
present but place it into question and potentially disrupt it. Th is other history, 
which would let history to be open to the other of history that evades historical 
understanding and calculation, is the history of the “other beginning.” Th e other 
beginning can only be articulated in thoughtful confrontation with the history 
of the fi rst beginning, as it unfolds from the birth of metaphysics to the totaliz-
ing technological world view of modernity. Heidegger’s critique of the narratives 
and explanations of historiography and the philosophy of history point toward 
an-other history—history as the history of being rather than of beings, the his-
tory of the other beginning that begins to be heard and said through the histori-
cal encounter with and remembrance of the fi rst beginning.
Heidegger begins Die Geschichte des Seyns from 1938-40 with the words: 
“‘Th e history of being’ is the name for the attempt to bring the truth of being as 
enowning event into word for thinking, and familiarize the word and its sayabil-
ity as an essential ground for historical humans” (GA 69: 1). Heidegger’s enuncia-
tion of history through the question of the history of being, as the happening of 
the truth of being, is an alternative to the narrative and explanatory models of 
historiographical and philosophical approaches to history—with all their politi-
cal implications—and their basis in the metaphysics of the fi rst beginning that 
thinks being as constancy and presence (GA 65: 31) and time as conforming 
with the present (i.e., presentism). Th e history of being reveals a heightening and 
intensifi cation of, a re-turning to and turning of, the understanding of history as 
facticity and decision articulated in his earlier thought.
3. History in the Early Heidegger
In this section, I briefl y discuss Heidegger’s approach to history in Being 
and Time and the even earlier lecture-courses. Already in §74 of Being and Time, 
Heidegger rethought the Dilthey-York distinction between Geschichte and Histo-
rie. Heidegger contrasts history as enactment and occurrence (Vollzugsgeschich-
te) and history as the representation and science of objectively present objects 
(Objektsgeschichte). History (Geschichte) points toward the absolutely originary 
history (ursprüngliche Geschichte schlechthin) as the fundamental temporality of 
being and event of existence (Dasein). History (Historie), however, objectifi es, 
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reifi es, and forgets the Geschichte that Dasein essentially is. Whereas Geschichte 
refers to history articulated from the horizon of the question of the meaning of 
being, which is rearticulated as the history of the event and truth of being, Histo-
rie refers to the models of history found in the ordinary understanding of history 
as presence and re-presentation, and which continue to inform historiography 
and the philosophy of history. Th ese understandings of Historie presuppose the 
“vulgar concept of time” analyzed in Being and Time as underlying everyday and 
philosophical understandings of time—whether linear or cyclical. According to 
Heidegger, these understandings block access to the history of being, obscuring 
rather than clarifying the history that we are.
Heidegger’s philosophical interest in history arose earlier in the context 
of the defeat of the Great War, the collapse of the old regime, and crisis of revolu-
tion and counter-revolution that saw the emergence of the Weimar republic. It is 
from this situation, and his post-war reading of Lebens- and Existenzphilosophie, 
that Heidegger fi rst spoke of history in light of the priority of event (Ereignis) 
and enactment (Vollzug), which are used in his fi rst lecture courses in opposition 
to the traditional concepts of subject and object, and from which the diff erence 
between “lived history” (Geschichte) and historical science (Historie) unfolded. 
Insisting that he is concerned with the question of “historical life” in its motility 
and facticity as opposed to the science and philosophy of history that presup-
poses without addressing that life (GA 60: 32, 34), Heidegger advocated turning 
from historiology and object oriented history (Historie or Objektsgeschichte)—that 
for him is typical of previous German historical inquiry—to originary history 
(Geschichte; GA 60: 84) as a lived or existential enactment (Vollzugsgeschichte; GA 
61: 2).
Th e intensifi cation of the historical moment as an originary and abso-
lute historicity is, Heidegger contends, “unrepeatable” (GA 60: 88). Yet Heidegger 
criticizes irrationalist absorption in the pure immanence and brute singularity of 
factical life, emphasizing instead the need for formalization—via formal indica-
tion and hermeneutical anticipation—in order to open up the concrete multi-
plicity of that life. Rather than celebrating the intuitive self-certainty of life and 
power, their fragility and uncertainty is revealed. Th e singularity and unique-
ness of the moment (Augenblick) is a crisis calling for an individuating decision 
(Entscheidung) and resoluteness in response to the situation. Th is dynamic and 
unstable moment destabilizes pre-existing concepts and habits, even while it 
evades and resists normalization and being subsumed under categories, classes, 
and universals.
For the young Heidegger, the Neo-Kantian focus on individuals act-
ing according to universal concepts never begins to access more fundamental 
questions of the historically singular being, which is in “each moment” called to 
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decide who it is by how it is, and the occurrence and enactment of that being’s 
individuation in relation to others, its world, and itself. Whereas previous phi-
losophy—including historicism and Dilthey—remains in the security and self-
satisfaction of derivative Historie, according to Heidegger, Geschichte needs to be 
existentially broached in relation to life that it is. Th at life shows itself in the secu-
rity and questionability of the hermeneutical situation and generation to which 
it belongs, and which does not only enable and open up concrete possibilities 
but also inevitably disquiets, limits, and shatters them. Th e historical situation 
is therefore as much a burden as it is a fulfi llment of life (GA 60: 31-33, 37). Its 
disquiet threatens historical human existence (i.e., Dasein) with its own ques-
tionability and tendency towards ruination (Ruinanz) such that understanding 
agonistically occurs and is enacted through counter-ruination and Auseinander-
setzung, understood as an interpretive diff erentiation (GA 61: 2).
Th is sketch of the early Heidegger leaves us with two questions: (1) How 
does Heidegger understand history diff erently than the everyday, traditional, and 
scientifi c conception that he criticizes and, given that some of the terminology 
is the same, (2) what change does the Contributions introduce with reference to 
Heidegger’s earlier portrayal of history, in particular since he himself criticizes 
his earlier thought as remaining caught within the paradigm of the philosophy 
of the subject?
4. Historie and Geschichte
Heidegger’s elucidation of history in the 1930’s is less concerned with the 
question of existential individuation than with the history of being, which ini-
tially seems abstract and removed in comparison with his earlier more emphatic 
and individualistic language. Th e distinction between Historie and Geschichte re-
mains in play even as the meaning of these basic words changes. Th e history of 
being is ensnared in the history of its concealment and forgetting in metaphysics, 
and involves the entangled diff erence between the calculability of historiography 
and the science of history (Historie) and the immeasurability and singularity of 
occurring history (Geschichte) itself (GA 66: 75-76). It might appear as if histo-
riographical history is more interested in the diff erent, individual, and singular 
in focusing on empirical plurality and individuality, yet it is attentive to these 
for the purposes of comparison, categorization, and calculation (GA 65: 151). 
Th e science and philosophy of history can obstruct contact with the question of 
historicity, of the singular and unique in its occasion and happening. Heidegger 
therefore comments that “historiographical comparison grasps the diff erences 
only in order to place them into a wider and more entangled fi eld of comparabil-
ity. All comparison, however, is essentially an equalizing, a referral back to the 
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same that as such never even enters into knowing awareness but rather makes 
up what is self-evident in terms of which all explanation and relating receives its 
clarity” (GA 65: 151). As such, it not only fails to broach but hinders questioning 
that which is singular and unique.
Th is is not accidental. It turns out that the narratives and explanatory 
schemes of historiographical history are implicated in the calculable and de-
signed world of modernity that culminates in the reduction of the meaning and 
truth of being (Sein) to being abandoned amidst beings (Seiende). Th is view of 
history belongs to the history of metaphysics, in which this history emerged as 
onto-theology and theodicy and was subsequently secularized in humanism, be-
ginning in the cyclical repetition of nature and the divine and concluding with 
the idea of progress, culture, and values. In theodicy, traditionally defi ned as the 
justifi cation of God’s justice in the face of worldly evil and suff ering, history be-
comes the product of God’s providence, whereas in humanist thought, history is 
the product of human activity. Despite their apparent diff erence and continuing 
confl ict, both share the presupposition that history consists of creating and pro-
ducing. Th eir identity can be seen in Vico’s Verum Factum, the true is the made, 
and their proximity in the thought of Hegel and Marx. Th is model of history 
as something made and produced relies on problematic notions of agency, de-
sign, intentionality, and decision. God reveals Himself according to monotheism 
through an ultimate narrative assigning meaning to all things. Human agents 
produce narratives and explanations allowing them to consciously decide and 
practically design their world.
As Adorno and Horkheimer argue in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
progress is identifi ed with the increasing domination of nature and the ratio-
nalization of human society in which human freedom and happiness are under-
mined by eff orts to realize them. Aft er the Holocaust, and philosophers such as 
Adorno and Heidegger, the philosophy of history is in crisis. History as a prod-
uct or construct of divine and human activity, as the creation of an inherently 
meaningful and good order, has fallen into doubt even as such models continue 
to inform the ambitions of authoritarian leaders and dreams of their followers. 
Heidegger questions history interpreted as a creation, design, making, planning, 
and producing because such models are inherently calculative in instrumentally 
reducing beings and their signifi cance to a further being and its purposes. Th is 
questioning remains salient given the continuing power and violence of this in-
strumental paradigm that does not allow beings to have their own immanent 
and self-generating—rather than externally imposed—signifi cance.
Just as historicity is clarifi ed through facticity in his early thought, a fac-
ticity that resists and withdraws from the intentionality of consciousness, history 
is articulated in the 1930’s beyond the activities of the subject through the self-
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generativity of “Ereignis.” In ordinary German it signifi es “event” and, because of 
the verbal sense of er-eignen, has been translated as the event of appropriation, 
propriation, and enownment. In these texts from the 1930’s, Heidegger envis-
aged history as the history of being—thus moving, at least on a surface reading, 
from the more Dasein-centered perspective of Being and Time to the being-cen-
tered perspective of his later thought—and explored this history as Ereignis, the 
enowning and disowning event of being in its disclosure and concealment.
What does Ereignis signify? It is the self-generating event of history itself, 
what makes history as the immanent event and enactment of a being—and thus 
historiographical narrative and explanation—possible. It furthermore names the 
other of history entering into and potentially interrupting and transforming ex-
isting historical life. It intimates the continuity of history, its epochal breaks, and 
the irremovable caesura between the history of the fi rst beginning and that of 
the other beginning (GA 65: 177). Nevertheless, this does not imply the “end” 
of totalizing narrative and reductive explanation in history or the impossibility 
of history as theodicy or a determinate teleological order, whether in its divine 
or secular variants, because “we” historically situated fi nite mortals still dwell 
within this “end” and have not yet crossed over to a “totally other” thinking and 
dwelling.
Th e history of Western ontology concerns history in respect to the histo-
ry of the disclosure and concealment, the forgetting and remembering of being. 
Th is remembering, which Heidegger later describes as the “step back” in opposi-
tion to the recovery and absorption involved in Hegelian recollection, does not 
make the past present but “is a matter of becoming aware of our essential abode 
in history” (GA 51: 92-93). It is a remembering oriented toward the future (that 
is, the not yet and non-present) rather than the kind of remembering that “can 
only remember from out of and by appealing to something present and some-
thing that has been present . . .” (GA 65: 257). Th us, in Heidegger’s portrayal, “In 
the other beginning . . . a being is never actual in the sense of this ‘being-present.’ 
Even where this being-present is encountered in constancy, it is the most fl eeting 
thing for the originary projecting-open of the truth of being” (GA 65: 257).
Th e dismantling of history emerges as both the possibility of confront-
ing what is past and of being responsive to the unsaid. In this sense, hermeneu-
tics remains a possibility of individuation in relation to the tradition that it dis-
closes and conceals; it occurs through a dialogue that inherently sets-apart. Th is 
strategy of receptivity through confrontation, informs both the early Heidegger’s 
thinking of facticity and his later thought of the event. Hence, for example, in 
receptivity to the event, to think with the self-interrupting movement of Hei-
degger’s Contributions, one comports oneself to the “origin” in order to think it 
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in relation to the excess and other of that origin. Heidegger called this the “other 
beginning” of the fi rst beginning and the “always-still-other” of the same (GA 
65: 52). Th e “other beginning” is the “origin” as interruptive break (Ab-bruch). It is 
not a cause, a reason, a motive, a principle, a mover or creator, nor a ground in the 
sense of condition. It is the ground that is an Ab-grund, an “inexhaustable abyss” 
(GA 65: 29), and therefore the recollection (Erinnerung) of an origin is relent-
lessly confronted by diff erence. Th is diff erence calls for thoughtful remembrance 
(Andenken). Th e thought of the “always-still-other,” which escapes thought and 
recollection, hints at Heidegger’s earlier understanding of temporality. Time is 
not a series of discrete now-points or pure presence. Th e present or today is 
never simply or self-identically itself. It is structured by a past that it can never 
retrieve and open toward a future that is unknowable. Heidegger questioned the 
idea that the future only continues the present, the calculable future of planning, 
in favor of a divergent future springing from another history, i.e., from the other 
beginning (GA 69: 16). Th ese writings suggest a more radical temporal facticity 
than his earlier thought; that of a past that never was and a future that is always 
other due to its discontinuity with the present. Heidegger’s thinking of the event 
remains hermeneutical in hinting at the “hermeneutics of facticity” and the “her-
meneutical circle” even as these are further decentered.7
Yet what does this mean? Heidegger rejected the ordinary model of un-
derstanding that fi nds its primary expression in the standard view of histori-
ography. For Heidegger, “Man is either ready for what is always original, or he 
knows better. Knowing better also reigns where man seems to subjugate himself 
to a divine world-plan. Th is knowing better begins in Western historiological 
consciousness. Th e rise and universal currency of historiological science and its 
varied utilization and exploitation, however, are already the late development of 
man’s calculating ‘attitude’ toward history” (GA 51: 6-7). As such, the confl ict of 
worldviews has been displaced by what he would later call enframing (Ge-stell) 
as the world-picture or Gestalt of technological modernity.
5. Who “Understands Better”?
Understanding is frequently interpreted according to a model of “un-
derstanding better” that fi nds its clearest expression in the hermeneutical maxim 
7 Heidegger noted the circularity of phenomenology, as a primordial nonobjective and pretheo-
retical science, in his fi rst lecture courses, where it helps explicate the indeterminate-determinate 
character of life as signifi cant (GA 56/57: 14-16). Hermeneutical circularity allows the immanent 
and implicit indeterminate-determinate signifi cance of life to become explicit, an explication infi -
nitely dependent on the implicit and unsaid.
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that “one should understand the author better than the author does,” or “under-
stand a tradition better than the tradition understands itself.” Exemplars of this 
interpretive strategy, which consumes its objects leaving them without any in-
trinsic signifi cance, is the Christian appropriation of Judaism and Greek philoso-
phy, and the sublimating mastery of the other in dialectics. Although there are 
a variety of ways of interpreting the maxim of “understanding better,” from the 
principle of charity and maximizing rationality to immanent critique, the her-
meneutic model of understanding better entails for Heidegger that what is being 
understood “contains a content in which we ourselves can grow” (GA 25: 4-5).
“Understanding better” should not be the repetition and deepening of 
identity, it indicates instead the need for a diff erent interpretation that does not 
make others understandable only by reconstructing their position from our own 
perspective. Understanding better involves a responsive “understanding appro-
priately” or it is not an understanding of the other as other at all. Th us, Heidegger 
suggests, “‘Understanding appropriately’ as ‘understanding better’ is no mere re-
jection of what is understood but rather is giving it ‘validity.’ A philosophy truly 
has ‘validity’ when its own power is released and the possibility is provided for it 
to deliver a shock and to make a diff erence” (GA 25: 4-5).
Understanding better implies understanding diff erently from out of the 
diff erence, the material alterity, of what is to be understood. Th e validity given to 
it in my understanding is its own occurrence and self-generating validity. On the 
one hand, this involves giving oneself over to what is to be thought and under-
stood. Th is Hingabe is a “letting” and releasement toward the being rather than 
a reconstruction or imposition of an extrinsic meaning. On the other hand, this 
receptivity is not an indiff erent passivity. It ensues through the struggle of inter-
pretation, a contest or agon leading to the question addressing and questioning 
not only the other but oneself, such that confl ict and confrontation are involved 
in all interpretation (GA 25: 4-5); in particular when it is responsive. To respon-
sively understand the other is to risk oneself and one’s own understanding in 
encountering the other rather than “understanding better” from the self-certain 
security of one’s own understanding.
In Heidegger’s pluralistic hermeneutics, the responsiveness of under-
standing demands diff erentiating confrontation and destructuring if it is to be 
truly responsive to and responsible for the question to be thought. Heidegger’s 
thinking of Auseinandersetzung, for which destructuring is preliminary (GA 66: 
68fn), culminates aft er 1935 in his being-historical thinking of the originary 
confrontation of the fi rst beginning, the truth of beings, with the other begin-
ning, the truth of being (GA 49: 189-190). Th inking from this other beginning 
throws metaphysics and its thinking of history from out of the presence of the 
present into question (GA 49: 5, 10).
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Understanding better can be a mastering, however, if it subordinates this 
diff erence to the logic of identity and construes others as the raw material for its 
own activities. Contrary to Heidegger’s thinking history as historical confronta-
tion in relation to that which is unique (GA 66: 75), dialectics is a model in which 
the other is to be assimilated or excluded, mediated or canceled (Aufh ebung). 
Th is “mediating” way of enacting understanding risks refusing the question of 
its own self-understanding in encountering what is other. Against the risk of 
exposure to the depth of otherness—in the other, the world, and the self—it re-
instates narrative and teleological representation against its breakdowns, failures 
and limits. Every limit is “transgressed” in order to be “re-appropriated.” Th is pro-
gressive model privileges one moment of temporality over another and operates 
according to a line of development in which the other is to be sublimated and 
eliminated as a “lesser” moment or version of myself. In strong versions of teleol-
ogy, as in Hegelian dialectics, history is not interpreted according to its character 
of the facticity and possibility of an event. Its possibility and “being underway” is 
subordinated to the necessity of a fi nal outcome or result.
In strong teleological accounts, history is prescribed a narrative of pur-
pose proceeding from origin to goal (condition to result). It is a narrative judg-
ing history through the assumption of privilege based on an order of progress, 
regress or cycles. For Heidegger, in contrast to the setting up and reifi cation of 
an external purpose governing history and time; “Seeking itself is the goal. And 
this means that ‘goals’ are still too much in the foreground and still take place 
ahead of being—and thus bury what is needful” (GA 65: 18). Not only does the 
reifi cation of history as determined by an ultimate outcome do violence to all 
the moments of the past in denying them any inherent signifi cance, goal-ori-
ented calculative thought misses the way and being underway of thinking, its 
very questionability. By contrast, being itself undermines these goals and proj-
ects revealing their limited and conditional character in in the interruption and 
breakdown of explainability (GA 65: 477).
Explanation, including its teleological and effi  cient-causal variants, is 
criticized by Heidegger for spatializing temporality (whether imagined as the 
line, cycle or circle) and repeating the “vulgar concept of time.” Heidegger ana-
lyzed this vulgar concept, which involves serializing time into equivalent and 
symmetrical moments as well as the reduction of ecstatic temporality to the 
monistic identity of the present. Although Heidegger inadequately developed 
this critique in Being and Time, it remains applicable. Spatialized time condenses 
the spontaneity and receptivity of worldly relations of meaning and sense to an 
explanatory schema of those relations, such as one fi nds in causal explanation, 
eliminating the asymmetry, distance, and interval between occurrences and the 
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temporal “ecstases” of past, present, and future. Th is critique of spatializing time is 
deepened in the late 1930’s (GA 67: 127).
Th e return involved in remembrance (Andenken, which should be distin-
guished from Hegelian Erinnerung) does not eliminate distance and diff erence in 
order to be submerged in the “origin,” as this nostalgic strategy—which Heidegger 
has himself been accused of by Adorno and others—stays within representational 
and explanatory thinking: “But returning into the fi rst beginning (the ‘retrieval’) is 
not displacement into what has passed, as if this could be made ‘actual’ again in the 
usual sense. Returning to the fi rst beginning is precisely distancing oneself from it. 
It is taking up that remote-position that is necessary in order to experience what 
began in and as that beginning. For without this distant-positioning—and only the 
positioning in the other beginning is a suffi  cient one—we always stay insidiously 
too close to that beginning, insofar as we are still covered over and pinned down 
by what issues from the beginning” (GA 65: 185-186). In the diff erentiating dis-
tancing encounter with the fi rst beginning, the possibility of the other beginning 
and thinking steps forward from that diff erence and distance itself.
Heidegger calls attention to how such explanatory forms prevent the recogni-
tion of the inexhaustible strangeness of the unfamiliar (GA 51: 82-83). Th e history of 
being opens up the possibility of encountering this strangeness and confronting total-
izing accounts, including teleological reconstructions, insofar as “there is no privileged 
standpoint at the end of philosophy, simply a diff erent standpoint, one that is as much 
defi ned by what it lacks—a word for being—as by its positive characteristics.”8 Th e 
history of being—being in its forgottenness, oblivion, and withdrawal—does not itself 
operate as an explanation. According to Robert Bernasconi: “Nor can the oblivion of 
being serve as a principle of explanation, so long as we understand by explanation a 
referring of the unknown to the known. Th e oblivion of being is in principle an un-
known; the history of such oblivion errancy.”9
Instead of assuming the identity of history, thought exposes itself to the 
unfamiliar for the sake of genuinely encountering the historical as historical. 
Already in the early 1920’s, Heidegger challenged the traditional hermeneutical 
model of “understanding better” with the practice of Auseinandersetzung (GA 25: 
3-5). Auseinanderstezung literally signifi es setting-apart-from-each-other. What it 
suggests, nonetheless, is a responsive confrontation. It is a confrontation in dis-
mantling reifi ed structures, and responsive in that it dismantles precisely in order 
to listen to what is said and left  unsaid. Such historical confrontation is intensifi ed 
in his thinking of the upsurge and event of being (GA 66: 76-77).
8 Robert Bernasconi, Th e Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1985), 7.
9 Ibid. 8.
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6. Historically Mindful Refl ection
Heidegger distinguished in Besinnung (GA 66, translated as Mindfulness) 
the disruptive history of the “other beginning” from the narratives and explana-
tions (Historie) of the origin (GA 66: 275). Th is restates the diff erence between 
historical understanding, as historically mindful refl ection (Besinnung), and cal-
culating explanation operating according to cause and eff ect and origin and goal. 
Th e “origin” sought in explanation operates as a condition and reduces phenom-
ena and the plural givenness of things to a fi rst cause or principle (whether di-
vine or natural). In the history of the fi rst beginning, God is the unconditional 
and infi nite ground of being and cause of beings (GA 66: 242). It is this explana-
tory and reductive use of God that Heidegger confronted in the destructuring 
of Western metaphysics as onto-theo-logy. In confrontation with the fi rst begin-
ning, the prehistory of the other beginning emerges, the other beginning hinting 
at being as the enowning event and upsurge of the unfathomable non-ground or 
abyss (GA 66: 242). Without hierarchical subordination to a fi rst cause or condi-
tion, being is the open horizon and crossing of the “between.”
Th e “other beginning” elicited through Besinnung is the other of the “fi rst 
beginning,” the metaphysical origin. Interrupting the identity inspiring meta-
physics, it is the “always-still-other” (GA 65: 52) that can neither be explicated 
nor considered the condition of all phenomena. While Besinnung asks the ques-
tion “who?,”10 and concerns the who deciding its history in its distress, the ques-
tion “why?” asks for a cause, ground, reason or condition reducing one phenom-
enon to another (GA 66: 271-274). Heidegger questions whether “the ‘why’ can 
still be made into a tribunal before which being is to be placed?” (GA 65: 509). 
Th e “why” cannot approach being insofar as it already presupposes an answer 
to it. Th e why question is not the neutral beginning imagined by science, as it 
already presupposes an answer as “what”—essence and substance—and thus an 
interpretation of beings as entities. Th e priority of the “why” question demands 
the explanation of one event through another, one thing through another, link-
ing modern calculative thought with metaphysics as “onto-theology.” Th e ques-
tion “what?” also resides in the dominion of the explainable and intelligible. In 
contrast to seeking the why and the what, the basic questions of western meta-
physics, Heidegger remarks that it is the question “who?” that transformatively 
transposes the questioner into the belongingness of the hiddenness of being (GA 
66: 148).
10 Heidegger would at various times express the priority of the “who” question, like when he 
asked “who is time?” in the early 1920’s.
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Th e diff erence between Geschichte and Historie remained, to briefl y re-
capitulate, a central theme from the early “hermeneutics of facticity” to his later 
history of being. Historicity is crucial from his consideration of the fi nitude and 
uncanniness of Da-sein in the 1920’s to his revised questioning of history as 
the history of being in the late 1930’s. Uncanniness and violence are historically 
interconnected, and emerge in a particular confi guration in the history of the 
West. Th ese issues continue to resonate aft er Heidegger’s so-called “turn” (Kehre). 
In Heidegger’s inquiries of the late 1930’s, there is a renewed attempt to think 
the relation of preparatory thinking of Besinnung and history in the notion of 
event (Ereignis). Heidegger approaches the historical through “seinsgeschichtliches 
Denken” (to think history from out of the history of being), Ereignis (the event 
of history and the “other” of history, the event of appropriation that expropriates 
human existence, and the disclosure and withdrawal of being in history), and the 
“always-still-other” (Immer-noch-Andere) disclosed in historically interpretive 
thought (GA 65: 52). In such historically mindful refl ection (Besinnung), ques-
tions of the facticity and alterity of being come to the fore in challenging strong 
holistic and teleological accounts that integrate history according to a common 
pre-determined purpose. In encountering the historical as irreducible to such a 
project, understanding and interpretation must take other routes to questioning 
the sense of the historical, and do so through asking “who?”
It seems odd to ask “who is the event?” Who is addressed by such a ques-
tion and what would it mean to answer it? Th e translation of Ereignis continues 
to be controversial, as some argue that translating it as “event” reduces it to an-
other ontic occurrence. Translating it as appropriation or enownment, however, 
makes it even more mysterious. Th e word event is appropriate if it is understood 
as equally the ontological as well as ontic happening of history and the other of 
history entering into the historical. It is the continuity of history as event, ac-
cording to a singular plural logic typical of Heidegger’s thought, and the impos-
sibility of history. Heidegger does not speak the messianic language employed by 
Benjamin and Levinas. Even though the event shares the interruptive force of the 
“weak messianic moment,” described by Walter Benjamin as a radical “now time” 
that cannot be assimilated by history, it also potentially upsets the ideological 
reifi cation of the strong messianic moment—apparent again in some contempo-
rary tendencies—that justifi es violence and dominion in the name of the sacred, 
the holy, and the ethical, disciplining time and history anew.
Engaging the history of Western metaphysics reveals the history of the 
disclosure, concealment and forgetting of being. Being is itself the ontological 
diff erence and intersection of being and beings, which cannot be included un-
der the same concept or mediated without reaffi  rming metaphysical tendencies 
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toward reduction and closure. Th is reductive conception of history means: “Th e 
ascertaining explaining of the past from within the horizon of the calculative 
dealings of the present. Beings are hereby presupposed as what is orderable, pro-
ducible, and ascertainable (…)” (Heidegger, GA 65: 493). Heidegger questions 
both contemplative and instrumental-teleological conceptions of history, resist-
ing the illusion of mediation, since transition is not mediation but Ent-scheidung 
(“decision” as the cut of diff erentiation, GA 66: 405).
Th is paper has shown how Heidegger articulated the diff erence of his-
tory as Geschichte, as open to its event, and history as explanatory and narrative 
Historie, which assumes intelligibility in order for dominion to be exercised (GA 
65: 493). Th e assumption of complete intelligibility and explainability closes off  
other possibilities for being that are still hinted at in poetic works and interpre-
tive refl ection (GA 66: 63; GA 67: 172). Historically mindful refl ection takes place, 
contrary to this closing presumption of explanation, as a preparatory thinking 
that can respond to what is other than itself. Historically mindful refl ection lin-
gers in the expectancy and tension of the “always-still-other” (Immer-noch-An-
dere) and “other beginning” seemingly lost in the always-still-identical and fi rst 
origin that would condition all. In Heidegger, we fi nd the paradox of a narrative 
of the history of ontology that operates as a counter-narrative challenging narra-
tive and explanatory order. Perhaps it can defy rather than reaffi  rm narrative and 
teleology by remaining in the tension between history as event and history as the 
continuation of the fi rst beginning in the history of metaphysics, and the diff er-
ence between being (Sein), which cannot be narratively spoken or described (GA 
69: 59), and the incomplete narratives of fi nite beings (Seiende).
7. Conclusion: Deciding Beginnings
Two signifi cant aspects of Heidegger’s approach to history are: (1) how 
it confronts and diff ers from the model of calculation, design, and production 
(Herstellung) and (2) how history is displaced from the subject to being and from 
“what” to “who.” Th is “who” is addressed in history as a historical being and who 
yet must decide about this history. Th is who decides on the basis of a history of 
being that does not provide a univocal narrative but involves the open and the 
hidden, disclosure and withdrawal. Instead of a progressive narrative about a 
beginning and end, origin and goal, history is the opening space of the question, 
the question of the fi rst and the other beginning, of the “always already” and the 
always still not and still other (immer noch nicht). History is accordingly moved 
from the realm of a calculating subject to that being “who” is addressed through 
history and compelled to decide about that very history.
114
Decision has to be rethought. Dismantling the reifi cation of the histori-
cal through Auseinandersetzung off ers the opportunity of confronting how the 
past has been handed down by tradition and of responsiveness to what is un-
said. In receptivity to the disownment or expropriation of the enowning event, 
which evades the mastery of appropriation and ownership sometimes ascribed 
to Heidegger, one comports oneself to the “origin” for the sake of what exceeds 
and overfl ows that origin. Heidegger called this the other beginning, which is the 
“origin” as break (Ab-bruch) and which resists being posited and manipulated as 
a cause, reason, motive, principle, or the result of production. It names a ground 
that is the lack thereof, an abyss or Ab-grund, entailing the recollection of an ori-
gin that is a remembrance faced by the diff erentiating cutting apart of decision 
(Ent-Scheidung). Such decision is for Heidegger not the “activism” or “decision-
ism” of a subject or its will, it is a historically-situated preparation and readiness: 
“Readiness to confront the inception can originate as genuine only from the ne-
cessities of history into which we ourselves are placed” (GA 51: 9-10).
Decision is not solely a human “doing” or “making.” Nor is it a “doing” 
and “making” of another being or being as such. Heidegger’s critique of explana-
tion and the paradigm of production place such categories of the done and the 
made into question. Contrary to Vico’s axiom, the true is the unmade rather than 
made. If such interpretive strategies are inadequate, decision should be thought 
diff erently. What hangs in the balance in decision is not making and designing 
but how one responds or does not respond. Th e human response to being in its 
historicity is at issue, and decision is the responsiveness and non-responsiveness 
of Dasein to being and its abandonment, to the earth which it preserves and 
cultivates or allows to be destroyed, and the openness which it lets be open or 
encloses, enframes, and forgets.
Th e argument developed above elucidates Heidegger’s thinking of his-
torical beginning as disclosing the “other beginning” and the “always still not.” 
Th e other beginning is the other of metaphysics, and the other of our history. It 
presents another possibility that is already at work in the Western tradition and 
can only be articulated in confrontation with that tradition. Th is possibility of 
a past that never was is impossible to think without the future, “the always still 
not,” that draws near without becoming present, and which opens other possibil-
ities for contemporary thought. Heidegger is then a philosopher of beginnings; 
not of nostalgic origins located in past presence, but of renewing and beginning 
anew other possibilities. Although Heidegger no longer explicitly employs the 
language of facticity, it provides a clue about this relation between the old and the 
new. An old that is “before time,” or at least any temporal horizon, and a new that 
is always “aft er time.” Th e old and new are present in their “non-presence” in time 
and history, as traces intimating what is other than that time and history.
